In recent years, much theoretical and empirical work has examined the economic role of banking market power. Challenging the customary view that a lack of competition in the banking industry is unequivocally detrimental to social welfare, authors have suggested that concentration of market power may in fact enhance the role of banks as information producers in their lending activity and their willingness to establish close lending relationships with their client firms. This paper explores a new dimension of analysis, investigating the effect of bank concentration on the market structure of industrial sectors: does concentration of market power in the banking industry lead banks to concentrate funding toward a few firms of large size, or does bank concentration foster entry of new firms over the life cycle of an industry, thus contributing to maintaining an unconcentrated market structure?
In recent years, much theoretical and empirical work has examined the economic role of banking market power. Challenging the customary view that a lack of competition in the banking industry is unequivocally detrimental to social welfare, authors have suggested that concentration of market power may in fact enhance the role of banks as information producers in their lending activity and their willingness to establish close lending relationships with their client firms. This paper explores a new dimension of analysis, investigating the effect of bank concentration on the market structure of industrial sectors: does concentration of market power in the banking industry lead banks to concentrate funding toward a few firms of large size, or does bank concentration foster entry of new firms over the life cycle of an industry, thus contributing to maintaining an unconcentrated market structure?
The analysis of a possible relationship between banking market structure and the market structure of non financial sectors has not been explored before, at least in the mainstream economic literature. Theoretical arguments could be made to support either a positive or a negative relationship between bank concentration and industry concentration. The study gathers empirical evidence on the effect of bank concentration on average firm size in 35 manufacturing sectors in 17 OECD countries.
It shows that sectors where incumbent firms are more dependent on external sources of finance have a disproportionately larger average firm size if they are in countries with a more concentrated banking industry. At the same time, further investigation has also shown that the effect of bank concentration is heterogenous across countries, with the effect weaker in magnitude in countries with more developed financial markets and a more efficient legal structure. This additional result nicely complements the principle one, in that it suggests that where potential entrants have easier access to alternative sources of funding, industries are less affected by the dominant role that concentrated banks may play in shaping their market structure.
Elucidating the nature of such relationship enhances our overall understanding of the role of banks in the economy. To the extent that bank concentration leads to more or less concentrated industries, this analysis exposes a potential link between characteristics of the banking industry and firms' conduct in other industrial sectors. For example, depending on market structure, firms may have different pricing strategies for their products or different incentives for technology adoption. Therefore, regulation that directly affects the market structure of the banking industry will also have effects, perhaps undesirable, down the line in non-financial product markets.
Overall, the results confirm and reinforce the complexity of the relationship between financial markets development and economic development, and the delicate role the regulator may play while pursuing policy objectives. These considerations point to novel directions of analysis of the impact of banking market structure on social welfare.
Introduction
In recent years, much theoretical and empirical work has examined the economic role of banking market power. Challenging the customary view that a lack of competition in the banking industry is unequivocally detrimental to social welfare, authors have suggested that concentration of market power may in fact enhance the role of banks as information producers in their lending activity and their willingness to establish close lending relationships with their client firms.
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This paper explores a new dimension of analysis, investigating the effect of bank concentration on the market structure of industrial sectors: does concentration of market power in the banking industry lead banks to concentrate funding toward a few firms of large size, or does bank concentration foster entry of new firms over the life cycle of an industry, thus contributing to maintaining an unconcentrated market structure?
The paper gathers empirical evidence on the effect of bank concentration on average firm size in 35 manufacturing sectors in 17 OECD countries. It shows that sectors where incumbent firms are more dependent on external sources of finance have a disproportionately larger average firm size if they are in countries with a more concentrated banking industry. The evidence also indicates that such an effect of bank concentration on industry market structure is heterogeneous across countries, with the effect being weaker in countries with stronger indicators of overall financial development.
The role of banking market structure on the market structure of industrial sectors has not been explored before, at least in the mainstream economic literature. Scattered evidence is found in the work of history scholars. For example, in his study of Italian industrialization in the late nineteenth century, Cohen [9] describes how a quasi-monopolistic banking industry "...led to the emergence of concentration of ownership and control in the new and rapidly growing sectors of the industrial struc-1 See, e.g., Pagano [22] and Guzman [12] for theoretical arguments suggesting that banking market power reduces equilibrium credit, thereby generating a negative effect on economic growth. Petersen and Rajan [23] , Shaffer [26] , Cao and Shi [5] , Dell'Ariccia [10] , Manove, Padilla and Pagano [20] , Cetorelli and Peretto [8] identify instead potentially positive effects associated with banking market power.
2 ture". Capie and Rodrik-Bali [6] note that the intense process of consolidation and increase in concentration that characterized British banking in the early 1890's preceded that experienced later on by manufacturing industrial sectors. Similarly, Haber [13] reports over a century of Mexican history, between 1830 and 1930, a very close connection between bank and industry concentration. The general impression from historical studies that bank concentration should be associated with concentrated industries is finally expressed by Cameron [4] in his renowned study on banking in the early stages of industrialization, where he states that "...Competition in banking is related to the question of competition in industry. In general the two flourish -and decline -together. Whether this phenomenon is a joint by-product of other circumstances, or whether it results from the decline or restriction of competition among banks, is a matter worthy of further research. It is a striking coincidence, in any case, that industrial structure -competitive, oligopolistic, or monopolistic -tends to mirror financial structure."
While important as analyses of countries' economic development, the empirical evidence presented in these studies is, however, limited by their focus on specific countries, periods and socio-institutional circumstances. Lacking in the literature is a broader empirical analysis apt to make general statements asserting the role of banking market structure on industries' market structure. What are the economic mechanisms through which a characteristic of the banking industry such as its market structure should have anything to do, possibly in a causal sense, with the market structure of industrial sectors? Indeed, a lack of systematic empirical evidence on this relationship is also accompanied by the absence of formal theoretical modelling to guide the implementation of empirical identification strategies. Nevertheless, we can delve on the existing literature on the economic role of banking market structure to formulate alternative theoretical conjectures. To this end, the framework proposed by Petersen and Rajan [23] represents a good foundation from which to ponder on the role of bank concentration on industry concentration.
Petersen and Rajan argue that young and unknown firms have easier access to credit if banks have market power. In their reasoning, banks with market power fund young firms with the expectation that they will be capable of extracting future rents once those firms eventually become profitable. Following their reasoning, one could 3 then argue that banks with market power, following their goal of profit maximization, should always attempt to select the best available pool of entrepreneurs, thus favoring new entrants along the entire life cycle of an industry. This is because new entrants are potentially endowed with higher return projects and more innovative technologies that would guarantee ever increasing profit-sharing opportunities for the banks. Therefore, according to this logic, bank concentration should continuously foster entry and therefore contribute to enhance industry competition.
Yet, maintaining the same premises in the Petersen and Rajan's model, it is also legitimate to envision completely different economic forces at play which could lead to opposite conclusions. Consider, for example, a nascent industry where a bank with market power may indeed facilitate credit access to young firms. Once lending relationships are established, however, at later stages the bank may have an incentive to preserve its ties with the older clients -now industry incumbents -and constrain access to credit to newer entrants. The argument is that by increasing market competition, the newcomers would undermine the market power and therefore the profitability of industry incumbents, and consequently the profitability of the bank itself. In essence, this argument follows from the recognition that market power gives banks an implicit equity stake in the firms they are already financing, thus potentially distorting their incentive to extend credit in product markets. This theoretical argument would then suggest that bank concentration should enhance industry concentration.
Judging by the formulation of these alternative conjectures, the effect of bank concentration on industry market structure is therefore theoretically ambiguous. Informed by such theoretical uncertainty, the goal of the present study is to derive broad, systematic empirical evidence on the relationship between bank concentration and industry concentration. The exploration of this relationship will deepen our understanding of the role of banks in the economy, and will enhance our knowledge about the normative implications associated with the regulation of the banking industry.
The paper contributes directly to the empirical literature on the economic role of banking market structure. Petersen and Rajan [23] show evidence that bank concentration is associated with greater credit availability to younger firms. Bonaccorsi and Dell'Ariccia [3] find more growth in the number of new firms in opaque sectors if banking markets are concentrated. Without distinguishing among sectors' charac-teristics, Black and Strahan [2] instead find a negative effect of bank concentration on the number of new incorporations. Cetorelli and Gambera [7] find evidence of an overall negative impact of bank concentration on value added industry growth, although sectors where young firms are highly dependent on external finance actually benefit from being in countries with concentrated banking. In contrast, Shaffer [26] finds a negative impact of bank concentration on income growth. None of these contributions, however, focus specifically on the effect of banking market structure on the market structure of industrial sectors. Thus, the present paper complements and extends this literature in a relevant dimension.
Methodology and model specification
In a recent contribution, Kumar, Rajan and Zingales [17] classify theories of the firm as technological, organizational and institutional and test several implications of those theories regarding possible determinants of industry firm size. They identify several industry-specific and country-specific factors. For instance, the degree of capital intensity, the amount of employed human capital and the R&D intensity are all possible characteristics, among many others, that are likely to affect an industry's market structure. Likewise, the quality of the judicial system, the set of laws and regulation and the level of economic and financial development are some of those "environmental" factors, common across industries in a country, which are also likely determinants of firm size.
This paper adopts a methodology that allows testing the validity of the theoretical priors regarding the effect of bank concentration on industry firm size controlling for the simultaneous influence of other industry and country factors. As Rajan and Zingales [24] observed, industrial sectors differ from one another, for technological reasons, in terms of the degree of dependence on external sources of finance. Then, it must be the case that the effect of bank concentration on industry firm size should be especially strong for sectors that more than others rely on external finance. 2 In fact, from the theoretical underpinnings illustrated above, we gather that bank concentration may play a role in industries' market structure by privileging or not clients with which they already have ongoing relationships; but holding everything else equal, older firms are those that are going to have longer and more established lending relationships. This consideration thus suggests that in classifying sectors based on their firms' degree of dependence on external finance, we should refer to that of the older firms in each sector. Consequently, if bank concentration eventually leads to the funding of fewer and larger industry incumbents, we should find that sectors where those older firms are highly dependent on external finance should exhibit, all else equal, a larger average firm size if they are located in countries characterized by high bank concentration. The exact opposite should be true if instead bank concentration were associated with unconcentrated industries. Since Rajan and Zingales [24] rank sectors according to the external financial dependence of both young and old firms (more than ten years old) we are able to implement the empirical exercise following this identification strategy.
More precisely, the econometric analysis is conducted using the following model specification: Industry average firm size is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total value added and number of establishments of sector j in country k. By basing the identification strategy on the analysis of the differential effect of bank concentration across industries, it is possible to control simultaneously for the effect on firm size of any other industry and country specific factor, which are absorbed by the vectors of industry and country indicator variables included in the model specification. In studies of cross-sector industrial growth, the share of total manufacturing value added of sector j in country k consistently predicts that sectors that had grown substantially in the past, and therefore are already relatively large, grow less in the future (see Rajan and Zingales [24] and Cetorelli and Gambera [7] ). Moreover, theories of an industry's life-cycle predict that a sector that has already grown substantially should experience less intensive firm entry (see Klepper [15] 
Data set
The data on industry market structure is collected from the 1995 Industrial Structure Statistics data set of the OECD. It contains information on manufacturing sectors at four digit ISIC level for 22 countries for the years 1986-1994. From this source I have obtained the series for sectoral value added and number of establishments and computed the measure of average firm size from the 1994 data or from the most recent year available, typically one or two years earlier. In addition, average yearly growth rates in value added and in number of establishments were also calculated. This data set has then been merged with that used by Cetorelli and Gambera [7] , in turn containing data from Rajan and Zingales [24] . The matching of the two data sets produced complete information for a total of 35 manufacturing sectors in 17 OECD countries. Bank concentration is the average between 1989 and 1995 of the sum of the market shares of the three largest banks in each country (see Cetorelli and Gambera [7] for details). The measure of external financial dependence is computed for the decade 1980-1990, and it is calculated on U.S. industrial sectors. Rajan and Zingales [24] argue that the "dependence of U.S. firms on external finance [is] a good proxy for the demand for external funds in other countries" (Rajan and Zingales [24] , p. 563-65). The authors calculate separate measures of external financial dependence for young and old firms in each sectors, where old firms are defined as those at least ten years of age. The additional variables used in robustness tests are also for the 1980's decade or from the early 1990's and they are described when introduced in the presentation of the results. Table 1 presents summary statistics for all the variables used in the study. Table 2 shows the pattern of firm size and external financial dependence across industrial sectors. The measure of firm size for each sector in that table is an average across countries. Similarly, Table 3 shows the pattern of firm size and of bank concentration across countries. The measure of firm size for each country in this other table is an average across sectors.
Comments on the data set
As mentioned earlier, firm average size is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total value added and number of establishments of sector j in country k. Two possible caveats are in order. First, such synthetic measure does not provide information regarding the distribution of market shares within the sector. However, this is to my knowledge the best measure of industry market structure available at a sufficiently disaggregated level (four digit ISIC code) for a significant cross section of countries. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales [17] have used a more sophisticated measure of average firm size exploiting available information on the size distribution across firms in a sector. However, such information is only available for industrial sectors at two digits ISIC codes. The trade off is therefore between a better measure of industry market structure and a worse level of disaggregation across sectors. Because the sought effects of banking market structure are based on rather "micro-based" mechanisms, linking bank conduct with individual firms in a sector, the use of a greatly disaggregated data set seems to be a more appropriate choice.
Another potential caveat in the measure of average firm size is that the data is available for number of establishments rather than number of firms. This may gen-erate problems of interpretation of the variable, if there are multi-plant firms and if individual establishments do not have independent financing decision power. To check on the reliability of the measure of average firm size computed using number of establishments, I have proceeded as follows. First, for each of the 17 countries in the data set, I have calculated the ranking of average firm size across sectors. For industry specific reasons, e.g. economies of scale, one would expect a "natural" ordering in firm size across sectors (see Table 2 ), and this ordering should be kept across countries. This is confirmed by observing the matrix of pairwise rank correlations displayed in the first block of rows of Table 4 . The correlations are all very large and highly significant. Next, the 1995 volume of the Industrial Structure Statistics reported information on number of firms, but not on number of establishments, for two other countries, New Zealand and Portugal. I have then computed for these two additional countries the measures of average firm size and the corresponding rankings across sectors. These rankings were then compared with those computed for the countries in the data set. As shown in the bottom rows of Table 4 , the pairwise correlations between the rankings for New Zealand and Portugal -computed using information on number of firms -and those for the other countries -computed using information on number of establishments -are remarkably large and very significant. This indicates that there is a close correspondence between the measure of average firm size calculated using information on establishments and that using information on firms.
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Another piece of evidence on the reliability of our measure of average firm size comes from a comparison with a measure of industrial mark-ups estimated for manufacturing sectors in a number of countries by Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat [21] 4 . One should expect to find a positive correlation between the two measures: larger firm size should be associated with higher market concentration, hence greater potentials for higher mark-ups. Confirming this prior, the correlation between our measure of average firm size and the mark-ups estimates is 0.36 and highly significant. Moreover, a regression of mark-ups on average firm size, controlling for industry and country 3 A similar comparison was also made using the ranks based directly on number of establishments and those based on number of firms. The pairwise correlations, not reported, were also found to be very large and highly significant. 4 The overlap in data was for 11 countries and 27 manufacturing sectors.
fixed effects, produced a positive and significant coefficient for the average firm size variable, and an R 2 = 0.49.
The results of these tests should confirm that our measure of average firm size is a proper indicator of industry market structure. A reinforcement on the reliability of such indicator will also come implicitly from some of the results of the empirical analysis. This remark will be pointed out in section 4.5.
The data set has also a characteristic that makes it well suited for the analysis at hand: the countries in the data set are all developed economies with limited variability in terms of income per capita levels. 5 This fact is important in that, as mentioned above, the information on sectors' external financial dependence, which is common for the same sectors across countries, is calculated on U.S. data. The underlying assumption in making use of this industry variable is that sectors across countries should be at comparable stages, in terms of their life cycle and technology adoption, to those in the United States, an assumption that should especially hold with this data set of predominantly developed economies.
Empirical results
We begin with a first round exploration of the data by regressing average firm size on industry and country dummies. The residuals from this regression were clustered separating sectors where old firms have low dependence on external finance from those highly dependent, based on whether they are in countries with low or high bank concentration. Low versus high reflects values below or above the median in the respective distributions of external financial dependence and bank concentration.
For each of the four clusters of regression residuals, mean values were then computed and they are reported in Table 5 . For countries with low bank concentration, the residual firm size of the most dependent sectors is negative, while that for the least dependent sectors is positive. Instead, in countries with high bank concentration, sectors highly dependent on external finance have positive residual firm size, while those at low dependence have negative residual firm size. 6 This first piece of evidence hints that bank concentration may favor market concentration in sectors where incumbents are more dependent on bank finance. The remainder of the paper presents estimation results based on the model specification (1), in the attempt to establish "hard" evidence that would confirm or reject this first finding.
The effect of bank concentration on industry market structure
The first column of Table 6 presents the results of the basic regression of the model in equation (1) . The dependent variable is the logarithm of average firm size of sector j in country k, while the interaction term is between the level of external financial dependence of older firms in sector j and the 3-bank ratio in country k. The industry and the country indicator variables are included in the regressions but their estimates are not reported in the Table. Unless otherwise reported, these variables remain the same throughout the analysis. As the Table shows, sectors whose share of total manufacturing value added is greater, are also, as expected, characterized by a larger average firm size. Our main variable, the bank concentration interaction, exhibits a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that, controlling for industry and country specific factors and for the specific stage in life-cycle a sector is in, sectors where old firms are more dependent on external finance have firms of disproportionately larger average size if they are in countries with high bank concentration. This finding is consistent with theoretical priors suggesting that banks with market power may have the tendency to preserve relationships with their older clients, which grow larger, at the expense of potential new entrants. From this point on the paper proceeds with the presentation of robustness tests of this main result and with further explorations of the relationship between bank concentration and industry market structure. In principle, the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction could simply indicate that bank concentration has no relationship with firm size and that sectors highly dependent on external finance are simply characterized by firms of greater average size. However, it turns out that highly dependent sectors are actually characterized by lower average firm size than low-dependent sectors. Comparing the mean values, the average firm size of sectors above the median of the distribution of external financial dependence is 26% smaller than sectors below the median.
7 If anything, this should dampen the effect of bank concentration on firm size. The interpretation of the evidence is also corroborated by the results in the third column of Table 6 , where the dependent variable was replaced with the number of establishments in each sector/country. As the estimates indicate, sectors where incumbent firms are more dependent on external finance exhibit fewer establishments if they are in countries with high bank concentration.
Endogeneity
A concern that may rise in this specification of the model is on the possible endogeneity of bank concentration. For example, a given country could specialize in highly dependent sectors, and those sectors in that country could be highly concentrated for reasons other than factors related to the market structure of the banking industry. Suppose also that these sectors require heavy and indivisible capital investments. Consequently, the banking industry, whose sources of revenue would depend especially from the industrial sectors that mostly require external finance, should be highly concentrated in order to accommodate the funding needs of those sectors. A possible response is that in order to support empirically this alternative conjecture, sectors that are highly dependent on external finance should also be those characterized by higher average firm size. However, as mentioned above, the data suggests the opposite. Sectors with high external financial dependence actually have lower average firm size than the others. We can learn more about the direction of causality from the pattern of industrial development observed in specific countries. A good example for this purpose is the study by Haber [13] , mentioned in introduction, which analyzes the evolution of banking market structure and industry market structure of the United States, Brazil and Mexico, over the same time period, 1830-1930. 8 Haber focuses his study on the cotton textile industry, as a sector characterized by high capital divisibility (no issue of minimum scale) and by the absence of technological barriers to entry. The only barrier was then represented by actual capital availability. Haber documents that the U.S. followed a path of significant institutional innovations in banking and other financial markets. In particular, barriers to the entry of new banks were removed early on in the period, 9 and consequently easy access to credit allowed the entrance of new textile firms and the preservation of an unconcentrated sector. Brazil and Mexico, on the other hand, followed a path characterized by more severe restrictions to institutional development of the financial sector. Yet, Brazil undertook important institutional reforms affecting banks and other financial markets much earlier than Mexico, as a consequence of the overthrow of the monarchy and the formation of the First Republic. As a result of those institutional transformations, Brazilian banks grew largely in number, credit became more available and the Brazilian textile industry moved toward a less concentrated market structure. Mexico, on the other hand, maintained a regulatory environment which did not allow the development of banks and capital markets. As a point in case, in 1895 three banks accounted for two-thirds of the total capital invested in the banking system (Haber [13, p.566] ). This fact, and poor quality of property rights and contract enforcements, significantly contributed to maintaining a highly concentrated textile sector.
Haber's study thus presents empirical evidence that, first, banking market structure is mainly affected by institutional, regulatory and political factors, and second, that the market structure of the banking industry is an important determinant of the market structure of a manufacturing sector whose firms were in need of external sources of funds.
These last remarks actually suggest potentially good instruments, so that the concerns regarding the potential endogeneity of the market structure of the banking sector can also be addressed empirically by using instrumental variables (IV) estimation. The following variables were selected as instruments. First, a measure of regu-latory restrictions on the banking industry. This cross-country indicator, assembled by Barth, Caprio and Levine [1] , gives a quantitative assessment of the restrictions on banks to be active participants in other markets. For example, whether a bank is allowed or not to hold equity participations of non-financial companies, and vice versa, or whether or not a bank can operate in the insurance market. A second instrument is an indicator of the legal origins of a country (see La Porta et al. [19] ), where the presumption is that different legal origins are responsible for different set of rules and regulations that may have had an impact on the market structure of the banking industry. Another instrument is a measure of overall market size, highly correlated with bank concentration, proxied at the country level by total gross domestic product or total population.
The benchmark equation was therefore estimated again with instrumental variables. The regression results, in the second column of Table 6 , show that the coefficient of the interaction variable remains positive and significant. Similar indication is obtained by the results on the same IV regression where the dependent variable was number of establishments (fourth column).
Other robustness tests
In order to test the robustness of the main results, I have estimated a battery of alternative model specifications. In all of the following regressions the dependent variable was average firm size. First, I checked whether the main findings could be driven by extreme values in the external financial dependence or the bank concentration distributions. Column (a) of Table 7 reports the result of the same benchmark regression where, however, the three least financially dependent sectors and the three most dependent sectors were excluded from the sample. The bank concentration interaction term maintains a positive and significant coefficient, with a point estimate that actually jumps up from 0.84 to 2.40. This is presumably due to the fact that, as noted above, there is a negative relationship between external financial dependence and average firm size, so that cutting the extremes of the external financial dependence distribution tilts up the coefficient of the interaction term.
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Similarly, another regression was run excluding from the sample the countries with the three lowest levels and the three highest levels of bank concentration. As shown in column (b) of Table 7 , the bank concentration interaction maintains an unchanged coefficient and remains significant.
As a test of outliers influence, the Cook's D statistic was calculated from the benchmark regression, and the same regression was then re-run after dropping the observations corresponding to the top 1% of the Cook's D distribution (5 observations). Column (c) reports the results of such regression, showing that the coefficient of the bank concentration interaction term remains significant, although with a point estimate reduced to 0.73.
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As mentioned earlier, one advantage of this data set is the similarity across countries in terms of economic development conditions. However, Turkey and Mexico, each with less than 4,000 U.S. dollars, appear as clear outliers in the cross-country distribution of income per capita, as compared with the other countries, whose lowest value in income per capita begins at above 10,000 U.S. dollars. The underlying assumption that the same sectors across countries are at similar stages in their life cycle is less plausible for these two countries. Column (d) of Table 7 reports the results of the basic model specification in which the observations related to Turkey and Mexico were dropped. The coefficient of the bank concentration interaction is remarkably stable, and it maintains a high level of significance.
Still with the intent of verifying homogeneity in the data set, another regression was run excluding from the sample non-European countries. The results, displayed in column (e) of Table 7 , show that the bank concentration interaction is still significant, although with a lower point estimate.
Another possible consideration is that the average firm size may appear high in some sectors just because those sectors have experienced a substantial boost in value added growth in recent years and entry of new firms has not followed yet. For example, in the data set, the median in value added growth rate, evaluated over the previous five years, is 4.3%, and the top 10% of the sectors-countries reported a yearly (about 17% smaller rather than 26%, as in the case with no truncation). 11 Other regressions, not reported, in which the observations corresponding to the top 5% (26 observations) and the top 10% (57 observations) of the Cooks D distribution were cut off, still showed a highly significant bank concentration interaction.
growth rate above 23%. The identified relationship between the bank concentration interaction and average firm size could potentially be the result of a predominance of these high-growth sectors among those ones highly dependent on external finance. A first observation of the data set reveals that the high-growth sectors are rather evenly distributed between sectors below and sectors above the median of the external financial dependence distribution. Nevertheless, a regression was run in which sectors that experienced growth rates in the top 10% of the distribution (59 sectors-countries)
were excluded from the sample. As the results in column (f) of Table 7 shows, the coefficient of the bank concentration interaction is still highly significant and approximately the same in size. 
Does bank concentration proxy for indicators of financial development?
A possible concern is that the market structure of the banking sector may vary at different stages of financial or institutional development. Consequently, the relationship identified between the bank concentration interaction and average firm size could actually underlie a fundamental relationship between industry market structure and general conditions of development of the financial sector. To test the robustness of the benchmark result to this argument, regressions were run by adding to the basic model specification terms of interaction between external financial dependence and a number of variables characterizing a country's financial sector at large. These variables are a measure of the level of development of the banking sector, one of general financial development, a measure of development of capital markets, and one of the general level of efficiency of the judicial system.
With a more developed banking sector, firms should have a broader access to sources of investment funds. Consequently, sectors more in need of external finance should experience more firm entry in countries with a more developed banking industry, thus implying a negative coefficient for the bank development interaction term. If bank concentration varies at different stages of bank development, then it might be that the significant role of bank concentration identified in the interaction term may simply indicate that highly dependent sectors display higher average firm size (slower firm entry) in countries with a lower level of bank development. Consequently, by adding to the benchmark regression the interaction of external dependence with bank development, the bank concentration interaction term may become insignificant. Column (a) of Table 8 presents the result of a regression where the interaction between external financial dependence and the level of bank development in each country was added. The measure of bank development is the commonly used ratio between domestic credit to the private sector and gross domestic product. The result shows that the bank concentration interaction remains positive and significant, with a basically unchanged coefficient, while the bank development interaction is not significant.
However, the overall availability of credit to firms may depend on the level of development of the entire financial industry. Rajan and Zingales [24] have argued successfully that a measure of the quality of accounting standards is a good proxy of the general conditions of development in financial markets. Accounting standards is an index reflecting the quality of disclosure of firms' annual reports (see Rajan and Zingales [24] , p. 571). The poorer such standards, the higher the information cost that financial markets have to sustain to determine the quality of an entrepreneur.
Following the argument made above, by adding the interaction with accounting standard (which should display a negative sign), the bank concentration interaction may lose significance. As the results in column (b) show, the accounting standard interaction is indeed negative and significant, but the bank concentration interaction coefficient remain positive and significant and actually the point estimate increases considerably, from 0.84 to 1.13. Another important variable regarding characteristics of the financial industry, which may also have an important effect on the bank concentration findings, is an indicator of development of capital markets. If it is true that market concentration may allow banks to discriminate between older clients at the expenses of new entrants, such role should depend on the overall ability of those newer firms to access external finance directly on capital markets. Hence, we should expect that in countries with more developed capital markets, highly dependent sectors should experience more firm entry. Again, if levels of bank concentration simply reflects different stages in the development of financial markets, the bank concentration interaction may lose significance in a regression where we add the interaction with a measure of capital markets development. The results in column (c) show that an interaction term where capital market development is measured by stock market capitalization is indeed negative and significant. Yet, the bank concentration interaction coefficient remains positive and significant and actually unaltered with respect to the benchmark case. Finally, the characteristics defining the legal environment in a country are also likely to have an effect on the financial system (see La Porta et al. [19] ) and through this on the market structure of the banking industry. Hence, indirectly, indicators of judicial efficiencies may also have an impact on industrial sectors' market structure through the same channels discussed above. Column (d) presents the results of a regression in which an interaction term with a measure of the extent to which laws are enforced in a country (see Rajan and Zingales [24] for details) is added. This interaction is negative and significant but the bank concentration interaction term remains positive and significant.
Is the effect heterogeneous across countries?
The robustness tests presented in the previous section indicate that bank concentration appears to have a significant effect on industry market structure that is independent from that of variables proxying for the general level of development of the financial industry. A complementary, yet separate question, however, is whether the effect of bank concentration identified by the interaction term differs depending on whether a country is characterized by a high or low level of financial development. In order to address this issue I have run benchmark regressions including as additional regressors the product of the bank concentration interaction with a dummy variable equal to one for countries with high indicators of financial development. More precisely, column (a) of Table 9 presents the benchmark regression of column (a) of Table   6 with the addition of the bank concentration interaction multiplied by a dummy equal to one for countries above the median in the level of bank development. The baseline interaction term is significant and maintains an unchanged coefficient. The dummy interaction instead is not significantly different from zero. This result indicates that the level of bank development is not an important discriminant to identify a possible cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of bank concentration on industry market structure. Column (b) repeats the same regression, this time adding the bank concentration interaction multiplied by a dummy isolating countries with a high level of accounting standards. This regression shows that the baseline interaction term is still positive and significant, and the dummy interaction is negative and also significant. Focusing on the size of the two coefficients, it appears that the effect of bank concentration on firm size varies substantially across countries: With respect to the baseline interaction term, the magnitude of the effect is estimated to be approximately 60 percent weaker in countries characterized by a higher overall level of financial development (1.143 vs. 0.448). Moreover, the coefficient of the baseline bank concentration interaction actually increases itself, from 0.838 (the point estimate in the benchmark regression of column (a), Table 6 ) to 1.143. Separating countries according to their level of financial development reveals a much stronger effect of bank concentration in countries where firms have more constrained access to alternative sources of external funding.
Informative results are also delivered by the regression where we add the dummy interaction for countries with high market capitalization. As column (c) shows, the dummy term is negative and significant. This result indicates that, in fact, in countries where firms have potentially broader access to capital markets the effect of bank concentration on firm size is about 45 percent smaller. Similar to what shown above, the coefficient of the baseline bank concentration interaction also increases, reinforcing the fact that the role of bank concentration on firm size is enhanced when alternative sources of finance are lacking.
Another regression was run adding the dummy interaction for countries with a higher judicial efficiency. As shown in column (d), even in this case the dummy term is negative and significant, being evidence that in countries with higher judicial efficiency the effect of bank concentration on firm size is reduced. As the coefficients show, this effect is approximately 50 percent weaker in such countries. As in the previous regressions, the coefficient of the baseline bank concentration interaction increases considerably, confirming a substantially heterogeneous effect of bank concentration across countries.
These additional exploration of the data has delivered the important conclusion that the effect of bank concentration on firm size is of heterogeneous magnitude across countries. This result indicates that where the conditions for firm entry are more favorable, due to higher financial development, the effect of bank concentration is much weaker. At the same time, performing regressions where countries are differentiated along such dimensions, we learn that the effect in countries with poorer financial development attributes is actually magnified.
Not of secondary importance, the tests also provide reassurance on the reliability of the measure of average firm size as an indicator of industry market structure: taking each and everyone of them separately, the regressions in the last two tables establish empirical evidence on additional theoretical priors related to factors affecting industry market structure that are independent from considerations related to bank concentration. In other words, the fact that various indicators of financial development and judicial efficiency are significantly -and plausibly -related to our measure of average firm size, reduces the likelihood that the measure of average firm size is just a "random" sequence of values which just happens to be significantly related with bank concentration.
Economic effect of bank concentration on average firm size
Bank concentration thus seems to have a significant effect on the market structure of industrial sectors, by contributing to increase the average firm size in sectors especially dependent on external finance. This conclusion has interesting welfare implications. Banking market structure would seem to have a role in the determination of market power in industries where they provide most credit. By affecting the pattern of entry of new firms potentially endowed with better technologies, and that of exit of older and perhaps less productive ones, banking market structure should also have an effect on the pace of industries' technological progress.
We can also gauge the economic magnitude of the effect of banking market structure on industry market structure. From the set of estimates presented in the previous sections, we learn that, for example, the firm size differential between a sector at the 25th percentile of the distribution of external financial dependence and one at the 75th percentile of the same distribution, in going from a country at the 25th percentile of the distribution of bank concentration to one at the 75th percentile, ranges between about a 5% and a 16% change around the mean of the distribution of average firm size. While this study cannot quantify the potential effect on the degree of market power in industrial sectors determined by such increase in firm average size, it is still the case that the effect of bank concentration on industry market structure is economically important.
Conclusions
This paper has investigated a new dimension of analysis of the economic role of banking market structure. The results show a significant relationship between banking market structure and the market structure of industrial sectors. Evidence from a cross-industry, cross-country panel indicates that, controlling for industry and country fixed effects, sectors where old firms are more in need of external finance, are of disproportionately larger size if they are in countries whose banking sector is more concentrated. This is true even despite the fact that sectors more in need of external finance are actually characterized, on average, by smaller firms than sectors that are less dependent on external finance. This result is consistent with theoretical priors suggesting that market power gives banks an implicit equity stake in the firms with whom they have already established long lasting relationships. This type of argument is actually not distant from that based on the observation that large corporations and banks may in certain contexts be under the common control of "interest groups", as represented by a restricted number of influential families and/or business associates. This line of argumentation, very much in the spirit of the corporate governance literature, has also been invoked in works in other disciplines. For instance, anecdotal corroboration of this proposition comes from Lamoreaux [18] 's historical analysis of New England banking in the nineteenth century, which shows how in that period kinship networks regulated the flow of bank lending to a restricted number of insider entrepreneurs. In the study cited earlier, Haber [13] observes how, "as late as 1930 most of Mexico's textile in-dustry was being financed through the same kinship networks of merchants that had established the industry 100 years earlier". Similarly, Sweezy [27] reports that in the 1930's about half of the 200 largest non-financial U.S. corporations and about a third of the largest banks were under the control of only eight well defined interest groups. And in the 1960's, according to Zeitlin [28, pp. 1103-1104] , commercial and investment bankers were disproportionately overrepresented in multiple U.S. corporate directorships. Tight interconnection between the largest U.S. banks and the top U.S. corporations in the same time period has also been the result of a study by Kotz [16] . If episodes of potential collusion between corporations and their financing sources can be detected for the U.S., which is considered one of the best corporate governance systems in the world, it is not implausible that such an argument could also apply to other economic systems as well.
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Whatever the ultimate theoretical explanation behind the empirical results of my analysis, the establishment of an interesting relationship between banking market structure and the market structure of non-financial sectors is worth in and of itself, and in such respect it wishes to stimulate further investigations. Moreover, elucidating the nature of such relationship enhances our overall understanding of the role of banks in the economy. To the extent that bank concentration leads to more or less concentrated industries, this analysis exposes a potential link between characteristics of the banking industry and firms' conduct in other industrial sectors. For example, depending on market structure, firms may have different pricing strategies for their products or different incentives for technology adoption. Therefore, regulation that directly affects the market structure of the banking industry will also have effects, perhaps undesirable, down the line in non-financial product markets. These considerations point to novel directions of analysis of the impact of banking market structure on social welfare.
At the same time, further investigation has also shown that the effect of bank concentration is heterogenous across countries, with the effect weaker in magnitude in countries with more developed financial markets and a more efficient legal structure. This additional result nicely complements the principle one, in that it suggests that where potential entrants have easier access to alternative sources of funding, industries are less affected by the dominant role that concentrated banks may play in shaping their market structure. This result confirms and reinforces the complexity of the relationship between financial markets development and economic development, and the delicate role the regulator may play while pursuing objectives of social policy. Firm average size is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total value added and number of establishments of sector j in country k. The share of value added is sector j's share of manufacturing value added in country k. Growth in value added is the average rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each country between 1989 and 1994. For some sectors in some countries the time period may be different depending on data availability. Similarly, growth in number of establishments is the average rate of growth in numebr of establishments for each industrial sector in each country between 1989 and 1994 or closer period available. External financial dependence relates to mature companies (more than ten years old), and is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with cash flow from operations. It is measured on U.S. listed companies during the 1980's. Bank concentration is the sum of market shares (measured in total assets) of the three largest banks in each country. The data on individual banking institutions are from the IBCA-BankScope 1997 CD for the period 1989-1996. The values reported are averages over the sample period. Bank development is the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP. Accounting standards is an index ranking the amount of disclosure of companies' annual reports for each country. Bank powers is a measure of regulatory restrictions on bank activities in each country. Stock market capitalization is the ratio between stock market capitalization and GDP in each country. Rule of law is a measure of judicial efficiency in each country. Legal origins is an indicator of the origin of a country's legal system. GDP per capita is the logarithm of income per capita in each country. The pairwise correlations in the first block of rows are based on the country ranks of average firm size, where average firm size is calculated using information on number of establishments. The correlations in the bottom rows are calculated for New Zealand and Portugal using information on number of firms. The dependent variable in the first two columns is average firm size, while it is number of establishments in the last two columns. The share of value added is sector j's share of manufacturing in country k. External financial dependence for each sector j refers to the borrowing needs of old firms. Bank concentration is the 3-bank ratio in each country. The results reported in the first and the third columns are based on OLS regression. Those in the second and fourth columns on instrumental variables (IV) regressions. The instruments were the indicator of bank powers, total GDP and the indicator of legal origins. Industry and country dummy variables are included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One asterisk indicates rejection of the null at the 10% significance level, two asterisks indicate 5% significance level, and three asterisks indicate 1% significance level. The dependent variable in all columns is average firm size. The share of value added is sector j's share of manufacturing in country k. External financial dependence for each sector j refers to the borrowing needs of old firms. Bank concentration is the 3-bank ratio in each country. In column (a) the record for the three least dependent and three most dependent sectors were excluded from the regression. In column (b) the record for the three countries with the lowest and the highest bank concentration were excluded from the regression. In column (c) the records in the top 1% of the Cook's D distribution were excluded from the regression. In column (d) the records for Mexico and Turkey were excluded from the regression. In column (e) the records for the non-european countries were excluded from the regression. In column (f) the records in the top 10% of the distribution of growth in value added were excluded from the regression. Industry and country dummy variables are included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One asterisk indicates rejection of the null at the 10% significance level, two asterisks indicate 5% significance level, and three asterisks indicate 1% significance level. The dependent variable in all columns is average firm size. The share of value added is sector j's share of manufacturing in country k. External financial dependence for each sector j refers to the borrowing needs of old firms. Bank concentration is the 3-bank ratio in each country. Bank development is the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP. Accounting standards is an index ranking the amount of disclosure of companies' annual reports for each country. Stock market capitalization is the ratio between stock market capitalization and GDP in each country. Rule of law is a measure of judicial efficiency in each country. Industry and country dummy variables are included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One asterisk indicates rejection of the null at the 10% significance level, two asterisks indicate 5% significance level, and three asterisks indicate 1% significance level. The dependent variable in all columns is average firm size. The share of value added is sector j's share of manufacturing in country k. External financial dependence for each sector j refers to the borrowing needs of old firms. Bank concentration is the 3-bank ratio in each country. High Bank Dev. is a dummy equal to one if bank development is above its median. High Acc. Stan is a dummy equal to one if accounting standards is above its median. High Mkt. Cap. is a dummy equal to one if stock market capitalization is above its median. High Law is a dummy equal to one if rule of law is above its median. Industry and country dummy variables are included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One asterisk indicates rejection of the null at the 10% significance level, two asterisks indicate 5% significance level, and three asterisks indicate 1% significance level.
